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Abstract: PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and 
have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government 
and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important 
branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the 
proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing 
mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the 
risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also 
minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the 
beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might 
be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information 
asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
New institutional economics, a newly developed branch of 
economics in the 1970s, makes up the theoretical weaknesses of 
traditional economics and strengthens economic theories’ 
explanation to reality. As an important part of new institutional 
economics, transaction cost economics emphasizes the influence 
of cost restraints on trade consequences during trade process, as 
well as implementing resolving system involved in order to gain 
an effective outcome. Update, transaction cost economics has been 
used widely in various areas. Meanwhile, the concept of 
“transaction cost” has gradually been generalized (Wang, Zhou 
and Tang 2005).  
PPP (Public Private Partnerships), which is a new operation 
model of running infrastructure construction projects, has an ideal 
performance in attracting social idle capital, raising utilization 
efficiency of governmental capital, introducing advanced 
management experience, etc. Nevertheless, since the beginning of 
project planning to the implementation till the closing phase, it is 
exposed to various risks, such as techniques, market, politics, 
policy, finance, society, natural condition, cooperation sides, etc. 
All these uncertainties involved in the project require government 
departments and private organs to establish risk sharing 
mechanism in contract, in order to ensure the smooth running of 
the project. Analysis on transaction cost of PPP project risk share 
is helpful for reasonable risk sharing between the government and 
private organs as well as raising the running effectiveness of risk 
sharing mechanism in PPP projects. 
This paper analyzes the transaction cost of PPP risk sharing 
method and risk holders. It also points out some critical problems 
in reducing transaction cost. 
                                                        
 1 Postgraduate, Department of Construction and Real Estate, 
Southeast University, Nanjing, China; 210096; PH (86) 
025-83792527; FAX(86) 025-83790021; Email: 
shushulee2003@yahoo.com.cn 
2 Professor, Department of Construction and Real Estate, Southeast 
University, Nanjing, China; 210096; PH (86) 025-83792527; FAX(86) 
025-83790021; Email: njlqming@163.com 
3 Lecturer, Department of Construction and Real Estate, Southeast 
University, Nanjing, China; 210096; PH (86) 025-83792527; FAX(86) 
025-83790021;Email: dengxpseu@tom.com 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL BASIS OF TRANSACTION COST 
ANALYSIS OF PPP RISK SHARING  
 
The Nature of Enterprises, which is published in 1937 by Ronald. 
H. Coase, is considered as the pioneering work of new institutional 
economics. In this article, the concept of transaction cost has been 
introduced into economics for the very first time.  
Although Coase didn’t give a clear identification of transaction 
cost, nor did he go any further on it, the concept of transaction cost 
has been used widely in different areas to deal with real problems. 
It also has a wide coverage, including fees involved in measuring, 
identifying and providing trade conditions, discovering trade 
objects and trade price, bargaining, forming trade contract, 
implementing, audit, arbitrage and maintenance (Groenewegen 
2002).  
Williamson, one of the representatives concerning transaction 
cost theory, once had a vivid saying for transaction cost as 
“friction force in economic world” (Wang, Zhou and Tang 2005). 
He re-identifies “transaction”, greatly broadens its ranges and 
makes the trade activities being more detailed and approachable. 
Williamson considers trade as a basic analysis unit, treating each 
trade as an independent contract and differentiates pre-transaction 
fees from after-transaction fees. Pre-transaction fees include 
contract drafting fees, negotiation fees and fees occurring to 
ensure the contract implementation. After-transaction fees include 
four kinds of fees, that is, errors handling fees occurring when 
transaction process deviates from the “contract converting curve” 
related sequence, quarreling fees occurring when transaction 
counterparts try to revise the mistaken sequence, fees of 
establishing and operating institutional structure for correcting 
errors and constraining fees for completely realization of 
commitment (Fei 1996c). Because transactions of different nature 
refers to different types of contracts and operational structures, the 
optimum operational structure is what saves pre-transaction fees 
and after-transaction fees to the largest extent. 
 
 
3. TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS OF PPP RISK 
SHARING 
 
3.1 Relations between PPP Risk Sharing and 
Transaction Cost 
 
Relations between PPP risk sharing and transaction cost should be 
exemplified in two aspects. Firstly, PPP risk sharing model is a 
kind of risk sharing contract between governmental department 
and private organizations. According to Williamson’s definition, it 
can be seen as a trade, thus should be comply with the principle of 
minimal trade fee. Secondly, PPP risk sharing is also a cost sharing 
between public department and private organizations. Project risk 
holder should stick to the minimal holistic fees principle during 
the risk management, thus realize the lowest transaction cost of the 
whole process. 
 
 
3.2 Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Sharing 
Model 
 
By maximizing their perspective advantages during the project 
cooperation, government department and private organization can 
realize the project goals. Therefore, the dealing of project risks 
should start from the beginning till its ending, and give a full 
consideration of different risks likely to occur at different phases, 
both for government department and private organization. PPP 
risks should include external environment risk, organizational and 
internal coordination mechanism risk and implementation and 
management risk. Generally, the former risk is almost in the macro 
level, the middle one intermediate perspective and the last one 
micro (Akintoye 2001, Li, Akintoye, Edwards et al 2005, Jamali 
2004, Jefferies 2002, Quiggin 2004).  
In order to best control risks, they should be handed to one part 
that are most capable, who can realize the most effective risk 
management with a minimum amount of fees. On the other side, 
the taking up of PPP risks should start with the project goals and 
places great emphasis on mutual cooperation. Thus, we can see 
PPP risk sharing in Table 1.
 
Table 1: PPP projects risk share 
Risk Level Risk Type Risk Factor
Macro External environment 
risk 
·Political turbulence and economic crisis                         ▲ 
·Imperfections of laws and regulations system                     ▲ 
·Unreasonable policy frameworks                               ▲ 
·Imperfect financial market                                    ▲ 
·Attraction reducing of projects to financial agencies                ★ 
·Adjusting to policy of interest and tax rate                        ▲ 
·fluctuation of exchange rate                                   ★ 
·Inflation                                                   ★ 
·Change of public need prediction to project products               ★ 
·Public opposition to project implementation                     ● 
Intermediate Project organizational 
and internal 
coordination 
mechanism risk 
·Reorganization of government departments                       ▲ 
·Credit and capability risks of private franchise operation consortium  
★ 
·Information communication handicap                            ● 
·Poor decision approval mechanism                              ▲ 
·Improper allocation of responsibilities and rights of collaboration 
counterparts                                                 ● 
·Risks of adaptability and completeness of incentive mechanism and 
dispute adjudication mechanism                              ● 
Micro Project implementation 
and management risk 
·Imperfection of early project preparation                         ▲ 
·Alterations of geological conditions                             ▲ 
·Risk of land availability                                      ▲ 
·Alterations of project goals and general requirements               ▲ 
·Alterations of the whole implementation scheme                   ▲ 
·Unreasonable project procurement process(risks related to fairness, 
publicity and equality)                                        ▲ 
·Force majeure                                               ● 
·Design defect                                               ★ 
·Quality defect                                              ★ 
·Construction cost overspending                                ★ 
·Progress delay                                              ★ 
·Risks of labors and materials availability                         ★ 
·Labors and materials price rising                               ★ 
·Risks of project health and safety management                    ★ 
·Risk of environmental effect of the project                        ★ 
·Behavior risks of project staff and sub-contractors                  ★ 
·High cost and low profit of project operation                      ★ 
·New technology implementation risk                           ★ 
▲－Public department  ★－Private organization  ●－Share 
 
 
From above table, we can see, the macro level risks are usually 
taken up by public department, the micro private organization and 
the intermediate ones are dealt with by both parts. This kind of risk 
sharing model reflects transaction cost changes among risk holders, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
 Figure 1: Changing relation between PPP projects risk share and transaction cost 
 
 
As the state and social administrator of politics, economics and 
culture, publisher of laws, regulations and policies and the 
regulator of the market, government departments are empowered 
with strong anticipation and control strengths towards macro 
environmental change, thus their holding of macro external 
environment risks is referential in saving costs and ensuring the 
smooth running of projects. Private organizations, the major part of 
projects, are responsible for the whole process of designing, 
planning, financing, construction and operation in its life cycle. 
Thus, their information and professional advantages are helpful in 
real-time monitoring of project implementation and management 
risks and reducing the transaction cost. Risks concerning 
organizational internal problems and communication and 
coordination mechanism between the two sides have great 
influences on the cooperation level. There can be substantial 
increase of extra cost and project running obstacles, etc, if the risks 
are taken up alone by either part of the project. Thus, project 
organizational and internal coordination mechanism risk at the 
intermediate level should be shared by both sides collectively, 
which applies to the cooperation nature of both sides in PPP 
projects, on one hand, and on the other hand, can reduce the 
holistic transaction cost of project risk sharing mechanism to a 
maximum degree. 
 
 
3.3 Analysis on PPP Risk Holders’ Transaction 
Cost 
 
According to Williamson’s transaction cost economics, transaction 
cost includes the pre-transaction fees and the after-transaction fees. 
The former one occurs before the contract signing, including all the 
preparation fees involved. The later one occurs after the contract 
signing, including all fees during the contract implementation, such 
as auditing and management fees, wrong doing fees, quarreling 
fees occurring from mutual responsibility shifting, mistake 
correction fees, reward and punishment fees, restraint-strengthen 
fees, etc. 
PPP risk sharing is also a cost sharing between public and private 
parts. The risk holder would take up a series of fees before the 
signing of contract, such as risk assessment fees, fees for figuring 
out risk reserving funds (management cost of risk and possible loss 
included), credit guarantee and insurance fees, etc, as well as fees 
occurred during project running, such as risk auditing and 
management fees, loss handling fees when risks occurred and other 
unpredictable fees, etc, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Variation law of risk holder’s transaction cost 
 
 
When analyzing the pre-fees and after-fees of PPP risk holders, 
we should pay attention to relations between them. The collective 
reduction in pre-fees and after-fees could of course bring the total 
fees down, while, in fact, the reduction of one fee would usually 
lead to the increase of the other. Thus it is better to find a balancing 
point. People used to pay a lot of attention to reduce the pre-fees 
while neglecting assessment in project risk parameters. This could 
reduce the pre-fees, of course. But it would result in problems 
during operation process of project risk sharing mechanism, thus 
increasing the more occurring of after-fees. Due to the long life 
cycle of PPP projects, there exist many uncertain elements during 
the implementation, which is greatly influenced by exterior 
environment. Losses caused by such kind of after-fees are hard to 
measure. Therefore, the participated sides need to have a sufficient 
analysis on project risks and their ability to take up these risks, and 
to do a good preparation job in prior period of project. Besides, it is 
necessary to establish a scientific and rational risk auditing system, 
ensuring the smoothing project operation and reduction of total 
transaction cost. 
 
 
4. CRITICAL ISSUES RELATED TO TRANSACTION 
COST REDUCTION 
 
PPP model is a kind of long-term cooperation between public 
department and private organizations, with the aim of effective 
play of capital value and efficient implementation, management 
and operation of public infrastructure projects, thus allocating risks 
and sharing interests. The transaction cost occurring during the 
establishment and operation of risk sharing mechanism is for the 
purpose of more effective cooperation of project participants and 
realization of project goals. So transaction cost can be generalized 
to three categories: cost of establishing and implementing risk 
sharing agreement, information searching cost and credit guarantee 
cost. Following issues need to be paid attention to in order to 
reduce transaction cost during the process of establishment and 
operation of risk sharing mechanism. 
 
 
4.1 Choosing Appropriate Contract Type for PPP 
Risk Sharing Mechanism 
 
Appropriate contract type benefits the effective reduction of 
transaction cost. Williamson applied transaction cost economics in 
explaining Mcneil’s classification of three kinds of contracts. The 
first one is classic contract or “complete contract”. This contract 
describes all the future items about goods and labors and specifies 
clear conditions and punishment method for back out of the 
contract. It places emphasis on “legal rules”, formal document and 
self liquidation without third party intervention. The second one is 
new classic contract, which is a long-term contract in uncertainties. 
Its characteristic is that the provisions are of no complete clarity 
and there exist “planning gap” and the third party on the basis of 
maintaining initial agreement. The third one is relational contract. 
Transaction parties agree on general targets, widely applicable 
principles, handling process and criterion in accidents as well as 
dispute settlement mechanism, instead of detailed behavior plans 
(Fei 1996b). 
Because of limited rationality, it is impossible to correctly predict 
and include all the probable coming events or remedy 
measurements when events happening, either is to settle perfect 
ways of loss compensation and problem-solving before default 
incurs. Thus no contract is totally complete, especially for PPP 
projects. Due to the long implementation period and great project 
uncertainties, particular study on project risk factors and possible 
loss, as well as reasonable allocation of various risks between 
project participants in prior period of project can not prevent 
project risks from changing during long-term project 
implementation. New risks may happen instead of risks within 
former consideration. In this occasion, occurrence of unknown 
risks are not effectively controlled and managed by project 
participants and the project risk sharing mechanism doesn’t contain 
allocation method of consequent losses, which will cause disputes 
between the two parties. The cost is often high of a lawsuit. So it is 
necessary to have an independent and professional third party as 
dispute settlement agency. 
Therefore, new classic contract is most suitable to PPP risk 
sharing mechanism. The initial risk sharing agreement of the 
mechanism should be maintained during project process. 
Meanwhile, the two parts should agree on the handling principles 
in case of the changes of project risk conditions and risk allocation 
disputes, as well as duties and work procedure of dispute 
settlement agency, to reduce transaction cost of PPP risk sharing 
mechanism to the largest extent. 
 
 
4.2 Preventing Information Asymmetry 
 
Williamson pointed out that people were inclined to be 
opportunistic, which was people’s consideration and pursuit of 
their self benefit and the important reason for information 
asymmetry. Information asymmetry is the difference of goods 
related information known by transaction counterparts. It is 
possible for people to benefit from either deceit and liar or 
cooperation to reduce information asymmetry (Fei 1996a). 
In PPP projects, both government department and private 
organization are possible to conduct opportunistic behaviors that 
hide certain information. Government departments know more 
about project intention, self capability of paying, laws and 
regulations, policy and institution, interest and tax rate, decision 
approval agency, land grant and internal situations of project 
procurement, etc. Meanwhile, private organizations are more 
familiar with their qualification, technique, financial affairs, 
quality, finance, staff and future market needs of project products. 
Both parts of the project are necessary to spend certain information 
searching cost if they want to know more about the other part. 
Participant with more information may have advantages on project 
risk prediction and management and will let the loss assumed by 
another part. 
Because of the long period of PPP projects and the life cycle 
project cooperation between government department and private 
organizations, information known by the two parts will be 
sufficiently communicated and proved with the project running. As 
a result, there is no after-information asymmetry in general case 
but pre-information asymmetry is probably existent. In order to 
reduce the transaction cost of project risk sharing mechanism, 
government department should strengthen the censorship to the 
qualifications and ability of private organizations in prior period of 
project to ensure their abilities to take up the project risks. 
Government department should also explicitly express project 
goals and requirements and provide private organizations with as 
much information and supporting policy as possible needed in 
project implementation, helping private participants with their 
analysis and assessment of project risks. Some related departments 
should establish information database systems about government, 
enterprises, individuals and projects, etc. and provide prompt 
feedback and renewal of the information to facilitate the references 
of project participants and reduce information asymmetry. With the 
principle of allocating risks and sharing profits, government 
department and private organizations should conduct prompt 
information communications with each other during project 
implementation to reduce risk losses as possible and decrease 
transaction cost of the two parts in the project risk sharing 
mechanism. 
 
 
4.3 Establishing Mechanism of Mutual Trust 
 
Williamson believed that there were two kinds of credit guarantee 
measurements, including credible commitment and credible threat. 
Credible commitment regards the other part as the starting point 
and emphasizes self responsibilities and obligations. While 
credible threat stands on self interests to make requirements to 
others and attaches importance to self rights (Wang, Zhou and Tang 
2005). 
It is true that both credible commitment and credible threat help 
promote efficiency as a contract needs cooperation between two 
parts with any individual part promising to stick to the contract 
strictly and ensuring the other part to follow the contract as well. 
But in PPP projects, government department usually hold the 
advantages of requiring private organizations to offer performance 
bond and advance payment guarantee, etc, which prevent risks 
from default of private organizations. On the contrary, few cases 
indicate that private organizations require government department 
to provide insurance measurements like performance bond, 
payment security and so on. As a result, private organizations take 
up too much transaction cost related to offering credible 
commitment and face the risk losses from default of government 
department. 
The core spirit of PPP projects is the life cycle cooperation 
between government department and private organizations, 
emphasizing risk allocation and profit sharing of the two parts. 
There is no doubt that various insurance measurements benefit the 
prevention of project risks. But credible commitment from one side 
will only increase transaction cost of one part of the project, which 
is inconformity with PPP project risk sharing principle. Thus, it is 
critical for the government department and private organizations to 
establish mechanism of mutual trust to advocate mutual respect 
and cooperation between the two parts. Project participant should 
not only actively provide the counterpart with credible 
commitment but also reserve the right to put credible threat on the 
other part. Meanwhile, relevant departments should establish and 
improve the credit reporting systems of government, enterprises 
and individuals, offering credit services needed by project 
participants. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In analyzing the transaction cost of PPP risk sharing method and 
risk holders, this paper concludes that risk sharing model should 
minimize the transaction cost among risk holders. So the macro 
level risks are usually taken up by public department, the micro 
private organization and the intermediate ones are dealt with by 
both parts. Besides, the risk sharing mechanism requires 
pre-transaction fees and after-transaction fees from both parts. So 
the participated sides need to have a sufficient analysis on project 
risks and their ability to take up these risks, and to do a good 
preparation job in prior period of project so as to reduce 
after-transaction fees which are often unforeseeable and hard to 
measure. The paper also points out three critical problems in 
reducing transaction cost: choosing appropriate contract type for 
PPP risk sharing mechanism, preventing information asymmetry 
and establishing mechanism of mutual trust. 
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